AIDS Prevention and the Right to Health under International Law: Burma as the Hard Case by Fronapfel, Rhianna M.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 15 Number 1 
2-1-2006 
AIDS Prevention and the Right to Health under International Law: 
Burma as the Hard Case 
Rhianna M. Fronapfel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rhianna M. Fronapfel, Comment, AIDS Prevention and the Right to Health under International Law: Burma 
as the Hard Case, 15 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 169 (2006). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol15/iss1/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright © 2006 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association 
 
AIDS PREVENTION AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: BURMA AS THE HARD 
CASE 
 
Rhianna M. Fronapfel† 
 
Abstract: Many commentators suggest that states have a human rights obligation 
to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS within their borders.  Specifically, state HIV/AIDS 
prevention obligations are often premised on the “right to health” contained within many 
international human rights documents.  Other approaches encourage states to implement 
AIDS prevention measures by emphasizing the detrimental effects of AIDS on 
economies and national and international security instead.  Many commentators who 
adhere to the health-and-human-rights model, however, reject such other approaches as 
overly concerned with the interests of developed countries and lacking the ethical focus 
that underlies health and human rights.  Implicit in such arguments is the suggestion that 
the health-and-human-rights approach is, or should be, the exclusive or preeminent way 
to encourage states to comply with suggested AIDS prevention measures.  
The health-and-human-rights approach, however, is not universally relevant to the 
development of AIDS prevention measures.  This is particularly evidenced by Burma, a 
country that has failed to take any significant steps to abate its quickly accelerating 
HIV/AIDS crisis despite the government’s official statements and actions manifesting an 
intent to combat the epidemic.  Burma’s failure is especially disquieting in light of the 
proven success of measures suggested by international health and AIDS organizations, 
and models offered by countries such as Thailand with similar epidemics and winning 
prevention strategies.  International human rights law lacks the binding or enforcement 
power to compel the state’s compliance with international HIV/AIDS agreements, and 
the abysmal health and human rights record of the Burmese government suggests that 
Burma is unlikely to be swayed by the ethical call of a health-and-human-rights 
approach.  Thus, Burma serves as an example of where the health-and-human-rights 
approach fails to bring about compliance with HIV/AIDS prevention measures, 
highlights the weaknesses of the approach, and compels the conclusion that the right to 
health is not a model that is universally applicable or useful in encouraging state 
compliance with AIDS prevention measures. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic is a problem of international concern.1  As 
the severity of the disease increased to epidemic proportions over the last 
two decades, developed states and the international community began to 
explore ways to aid and encourage developing states to treat and prevent the 
spread of the disease within their borders.  A host of approaches arose that 
aimed at encouraging developing states to implement HIV/AIDS prevention 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Veronica Taylor for her advice and guidance in the 
development of this Comment. 
1
  Lawrence O. Gostin, The Global Reach of HIV/AIDS: Science, Politics, Economics and Research, 
17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (“HIV/AIDS affects people throughout the world—their health, their 
communities, and their countries’ economic structures.  It is truly a global epidemic, imposing a burden on 
all countries and regions, leaving none immune to its devastating impact.”).  
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measures and to dedicate the resources necessary to do so.  Many such 
approaches encourage states to prevent the spread of AIDS in order to 
dampen the disease’s detrimental impact on economic stability and 
international and national security.2 
 Accompanying the rising prominence of human rights in international 
law, many commentators have promoted an alternate approach that 
conceptualizes the duty of states to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS within 
the health-and-human-rights paradigm.  Such an approach focuses on the 
duty of states to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS in order to comply with the 
“right to health” provisions found within many international human rights 
documents.3  The right-to-health approach is not necessarily incompatible 
with those approaches that focus on factors such as economics and security.  
Nonetheless, a tension exists between them.4  The very existence of non-
human-rights-based approaches implies that the right-to-health model is not 
always adequate, standing alone, to encourage resistant states to implement 
HIV/AIDS prevention measures. The suggestion that human rights is not 
always the most viable way to conceptualize state health and HIV/AIDS 
obligations, however, has proven controversial among some health-and-
human-rights adherents, a number of whom reject the other approaches 
altogether.  For example, a leading opponent of non-human-rights-based 
approaches argues that issues such as HIV/AIDS prevention are best 
conceptualized within a health-and-human-rights paradigm focused on 
health justice and equity rather than the “self-serving relativism” of a 
security-based approach.5 
                                           
2
  See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Caught Between Paradise and Power: Public Health, Pathogenic 
Threats, and the Axis of Illness, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 45 (2004).  
3
  See infra Part II.B.  See generally International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter 
ICESCR]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 
1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; and United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.   
4
  Compare PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NEW WAR 
ON THE POOR 195 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005) (2003) (promoting a human rights approach to improving 
health and criticizing security-based approaches), with DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (questioning the feasibility of a human rights approach to 
infectious disease treatment and prevention, and discussing alternative approaches such as ones based on 
trade and security). 
5
   FARMER, supra note 4. 
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Burma6 serves as an interesting lens through which to view this debate 
because of the severity of the country’s AIDS epidemic and the particular 
failure of the Burmese leadership to take any significant steps to implement 
prevention measures.7  The country is facing a major health crisis as the 
AIDS epidemic steadily increases largely unabated within its borders.  The 
last official report by the World Health Organization (“WHO”) puts the HIV 
prevalence rate in Burma at 0.77% as of the end of 2001, fourth behind those 
countries with the highest rates of infection in Asia: Cambodia, Thailand, 
and India.8  According to a 2004 estimate of the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS (“UNAIDS”), the rate of HIV/AIDS among 
adults is approximately 1.2% and as high as 2.2%.9  Other estimates put the 
current rate of infection in Burma as high as 4%, just behind Cambodia’s.10  
Given the prevention successes in the other high-prevalence countries, 
Burma is poised to become the country with the highest HIV infection rates 
in Asia if current trends continue.11  UNAIDS has recognized the seriousness 
of Burma’s AIDS situation and identified Burma as one of the three highest-
priority countries in Southeast Asia, stating that “there is a genuine potential 
for this very serious epidemic to grow out of control unless an effective 
coordinated response is urgently implemented.”12  Burma’s government has 
exhibited a commitment to combat the epidemic by finally acknowledging 
its existence after a long period of denial,13 and engaging in a five-year 
                                           
6
  This Comment refers to the country in question as “Burma.”  It should be noted that the Burmese 
government changed the country’s name to the ostensibly more ethnically inclusive name “Myanmar” in 
1989.  Many ethnic groups, however, reject the name “Myanmar” itself as ethnically exclusive, and while 
the United Nations and the business community usually employ the “Myanmar” designation, many 
Western governments (including the United States), non-governmental organizations, and commentators 
continue to refer to the country as “Burma.”  The use of “Burma” in this Comment is for the sake of 
consistency and expediency, and is not meant to signal an allegiance to either side of this debate. See Myint 
Zan, Judicial Independence in Burma: Constitutional History, Actual Practice and Future Prospects, 4 S. 
CROSS U. L. REV. 17 n.1 (2000).  
7
  See infra Part III.B. 
8
  World Health Organization (“WHO”), HIV/AIDS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC REGION 2003, at 11 
(2003). 
9
  Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (“UNAIDS”)/WHO, Myanmar: Epidemiological 
Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections, 2004 Update at 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.who.int/GlobalAtlas/predefinedReports/EFS2004/EFS_PDFs/EFS2004_MM.pdf .   
10
  Chris Breyer et al., Assessing the Magnitude of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Burma, 32 J. ACQUIRED 
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 311, 311 (2003); Jeremy Sarkin & Marek Pietschmann, Legitimate 
Humanitarian Intervention under International Law in the Context of the Current Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Crisis in Burma (Myanmar), 33 HONG KONG L.J. 371, 384 (2003).  
11
  See ELISABETH PISANI, MONITORING THE AIDS PANDEMIC NETWORK, AIDS IN ASIA: FACE THE 
FACTS 23 (2004), available at http://www.fhi.org/en/HIVAIDS/pub/survreports/aids_in_asia.htm (follow 
“Chapter 1” hyperlink).  
12
  UNAIDS, JOINT PROGRAMME FOR HIV/AIDS: MYANMAR 2003–2005 1 (Apr. 1, 2004),  available 
at http://www.unaids.org/html/pub/una-docs/jpmyanmar_15jul04_en_pdf.pdf.   
13
  Myanmar: Sickening, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 9, 2000. 
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UNAIDS plan, which includes guidelines for the government to increase 
prevention efforts.14  Despite these representations, the Burmese government 
has failed to respond to the AIDS epidemic in any significant way,15 largely 
preferring official denial of the severity of the crisis to serious abatement 
efforts.16 
This Comment argues that the health-and-human-rights approach is 
not universally useful in encouraging states to prevent the spread of AIDS, 
as evidenced by Burma’s situation.  The right-to-health approach is an 
inadequate mechanism to encourage Burma’s compliance because the 
Burmese government is unlikely to be swayed by the ethical call of the 
health-and-human-rights approach, and international human rights law lacks 
the enforcement mechanisms or binding power necessary to compel Burma’s 
compliance with international HIV/AIDS prevention agreements.  
Examining the health-and-human-rights approach through the Burmese lens 
demonstrates that the approach is not sufficient to persuade all states to 
prevent the spread of AIDS. 
Part II of this Comment examines the various approaches to 
HIV/AIDS prevention and the tensions between them.  Part III observes that 
the overall rate of HIV/AIDS infection is steadily increasing in Burma as a 
result of the government’s failure to institute prevention measures.  Part IV 
argues that the right to health is an inadequate mechanism with which to 
enforce Burma’s compliance with AIDS prevention measures.  Finally, Part 
V argues that Burma is unlikely to voluntarily implement AIDS prevention 
measures in order to fulfill the ethical call of a health-and-human-rights 
approach. 
II. BACKGROUND: HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER APPROACHES 
TO HIV/AIDS PREVENTION 
Within the human rights discourse, many commentators suggest that 
states have an obligation to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS in order to 
comply with the right to health found in many international human rights 
treaties.17  Other more pragmatic approaches exist that encourage 
compliance with prevention measures by focusing on the detrimental 
                                           
14
  Id.   
15
  Id. 
16
  Tony Broadmoor, Edging Towards Disaster, 11 THE IRRAWADDY, May 2003, 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/database/2003/vol11.4/cover.html.  
17
  See, e.g., Steven D. Jamar, The International Human Right to Health, 22 S.U. L. REV. 1, 181-182 
(1994) (noting that states should address the AIDS epidemic in order to comply with their right to health 
obligations). 
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security and economic effects of AIDS.18  Many proponents of health and 
human rights characterize such other approaches as being overly 
preoccupied with the interests of developed countries, while lacking an 
appropriate emphasis on ethics.19  Implicit in that argument is the suggestion 
that health and human rights are, or should be, the exclusive or pre-eminent 
mechanism with which to encourage state compliance with AIDS prevention 
measures.20  
A. Many Commentators Suggest That States Have a Human Rights 
Obligation to Prevent the Spread of HIV/AIDS Within Their Borders 
Ever since Jonathan Mann, the first director of the World Health 
Organization’s Global Program on AIDS, identified HIV/AIDS as a human 
rights issue,21 many commentators have framed the obligation of states to 
deal with the AIDS epidemic with reference to international human rights 
law.22  HIV/AIDS and the international human right to health have 
developed symbiotically over the past two decades.23  Not only has 
HIV/AIDS served as a catalyst for bringing the right to health to the 
forefront of human rights law,24  but framing HIV/AIDS as a right-to-health 
issue allowed it to be “anchored in international law,” whereby governments 
are publicly accountable, at least theoretically, for their actions toward 
people affected by the disease.25  HIV/AIDS is the first worldwide epidemic 
to arise in the modern era of human rights,26 and has, in a sense, become a 
test case for human rights in the context of public health.27  
In keeping with this trend, UNAIDS frames HIV/AIDS prevention 
and treatment largely as a health-and-human-rights issue.  According to 
                                           
18
  David P. Fidler, Public Health and National Security in the Global Age: Infectious Diseases, 
Bioterrorism, and Realpolitik, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 787 (2003) (advocating a security-based 
approach). 
19
  See, e.g., FARMER, supra note 4. 
20
  Id. at 199.  
21
  Jonathan Mann, Human Rights and AIDS: The Future of the Pandemic, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
195, 203-206 (1996). 
22
  See, e.g., David Patterson & Leslie London, International Law, Human Rights and HIV/AIDS, 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2002 80(12), at 965 (2002); UNAIDS Global Reference Group 
on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, Issue Paper: Monitoring a Rights-Based Approach, Fourth Meeting, 
August 23-25, 2004; and, UNAIDS Global Reference Group on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, Public 
Report, Second Meeting, August 25-27, 2003.  
23
  Sofia Gruskin & Daniel Tarantola, Health and Human Rights 1 (Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center 
for Health Hum. Rts., Working Paper No. 10, 2000).  
24
  Id.  
25
  Id.; LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, THE AIDS PANDEMIC: COMPLACENCY, INJUSTICE, AND UNFULFILLED 
EXPECTATIONS 62 (2004). 
26
  FIDLER, supra note 4, at 198.  
27
  Id.  
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UNAIDS, in order for states to combat the AIDS epidemic, “the right to 
health care, information and other social and economic rights inscribed in 
United Nations Human Rights conventions and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights must be realized.”28  
In addition, a number of international guidelines address the 
obligation of states to deal with HIV/AIDS under international human rights 
law.  While not legally binding,29 such documents clarify the right to health 
as it operates within the context of HIV/AIDS and the human rights of those 
living with the disease.30  For example, in 1996, the United Nations prepared 
a set of guidelines called the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and 
Human Rights.31  These guidelines not only called on states to ensure that 
their AIDS policies were consistent with “international human rights 
obligations,”32 and the principle of non-discrimination,33 but also to ensure 
the “widespread availability of qualitative prevention measures and services, 
adequate HIV prevention and care information and safe and effective 
medication at an affordable price.”34  Thus, many human rights adherents 
conceptualize the obligation of states to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS 
within their borders as a human rights issue, and many international 
documents reflect this perceived link between AIDS prevention and human 
rights. 
B. State HIV/AIDS Prevention Obligations Are Often Premised on the 
Right to Health  
Within the health-and-human-rights paradigm, the duty of states to 
deal with HIV/AIDS within their borders, including preventing its spread, is 
often conceptualized as a state’s duty to comply with the right to health 
                                           
28
  U.N. General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, June 25-27, 2001, Together We Can: 
Leadership in a World of AIDS 16, UNAIDS/01.34E (June 2001), available at http://www.unaids. 
org/en/resources/publications/corporate+publications.asp. 
29
  Such instruments are referred to as “soft law,” and include international documents, declarations, 
reports, or other instruments which “may be loosely defined as declared norms of conduct understood as 
legally nonbinding by those accepting the norms.”  JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 32 (2002). While nonbinding, such 
documents “are meant to, and in fact do, influence government behavior.” Id. at 24. 
30
  See, e.g., Patterson & London, supra note 22, at 965 (discussing what is required from states by 
the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights).  
31
  The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Second International Consultation 
on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, Annex 1, delivered to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1997/37 (Jan. 20, 1997), available at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1997/documentation/ 
commission/e-cn4-1997-37.htm.  
32
  Id. at Guideline 3. 
33
  Id. at Guideline 5. 
34
  Id. at Guideline 6. 
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found in many international human rights instruments.35  For example, 
prominent commentators Lesley Stone and Lawrence Gostin argue that 
government policies focused on respecting and protecting the right to health, 
such as the promotion of scientifically proven prevention measures like 
condom use and needle exchange programs, “will best curb the spread of 
HIV/AIDS.”36  Thus, understanding how HIV/AIDS prevention fits within 
the health-and-human-rights schema requires an understanding of the 
meaning of the right to health.  
The international right to health was first enshrined in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),37 which is regarded as 
the first major international human rights document and the “cornerstone of 
the modern human rights movement.”38  In addition to recognizing the right 
to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,39 the right to equal 
protection of the law,40 and the right to freedom of religion,41 Article 25 of 
the UDHR expressly recognizes the right to health as an element of the right 
to an adequate standard of living:  
 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or 
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.42  
 
Despite the widespread recognition of the UDHR pronouncements, this 
declaration itself is not a legally binding document.43 
                                           
35
  See Mary Ann Torres, Public Health and International Law: The Human Right to Health, 
National Courts, and Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment: a Case Study from Venezuela, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 105 
(2002) (examining Venezuela’s obligations to treat those with HIV/AIDS within their obligations to honor 
their right to health); see also Roger Phillips, South Africa’s Right to Health Care: International and 
Constitutional Duties in Relation to the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 9 (2004) (examining 
South Africa’s duties in regard to treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS within its obligations to honor the 
right to health); Jamar, supra, note 17 (discussing the right to health in general and noting that states should 
address the AIDS epidemic in order to comply with their right to health obligations). 
36
  Lesley Stone & Lawrence O. Gostin, Using Human Rights to Combat the HIV/AIDS Pandemic, 31 
HUM. RTS. 2, 3 (2004).  
37
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. 
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
38
  Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 313. 
39
  UDHR, supra note 37, art. 5. 
40
  Id. at art. 7. 
41
  Id. at art. 18. 
42
  Id. at art. 25 (1). 
43
  Patterson & London, supra note 22, at 964; see also explanation of “soft law,” supra note 29. 
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Since the inception of the UDHR, many of its provisions have been 
incorporated into numerous state constitutions and more than twenty binding 
multilateral treaties.44  The two most important of these treaties are the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”)45 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”).46  Together with the UDHR, these two major treaties are often 
referred to as the “International Bill of Human Rights.”47  While the ICCPR 
does not refer to health, the ICESCR specifically recognizes the right to 
health.  Article 12 provides that “the States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health”48 and “[t]he steps to be taken by the 
States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this 
right shall include those necessary for . . . [t]he prevention, treatment, and 
control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases.”49  As of 
April 2005, 142 countries have ratified the ICESCR.50  Burma, however, has 
not yet signed or ratified the treaty, and is therefore not bound by its 
provisions.51 
Other multilateral human rights treaties with right-to-health provisions 
focus on specific populations.52  Two that similarly include a right to health 
within their provisions are the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”)53 and the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”).54  Article 12 of CEDAW 
provides that “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, 
on the basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, 
including those related to family planning.”55  Article 24 of CRC addresses 
the right to health more directly, providing that states “recognize the right of 
the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to 
                                           
44
  Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 313. 
45
  ICESCR, supra note 3. 
46
  U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
47
  Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 313.  
48
  ICESCR, supra note 3, art. 12(1). 
49
  Id. at art. 12(2). 
50
  Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 313.  
51
  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of the Ratifications of 
the Principal International Human Rights Treaties As of 09 June 2004, at 7, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf..  
52
  Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 313; ICERD, supra note 3, art. 5(e)(iv).  
53
  CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 12. 
54
  CRC, supra note 3, art. 24.  
55
  CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 12(1). 
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facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health.”56  Burma is 
a party to both CEDAW and the CRC, the only two major human rights 
treaties to which it is a party.57  While there are a number of regional human 
rights treaties that also contain right-to-health provisions,58 there is no such 
treaty for Asia, and therefore Burma is not bound by a regional human rights 
treaty.59  
In addition to these binding treaties, human rights conference 
participants have passed a number of non-binding resolutions elaborating on 
the right to health.60  For example, the 1978 Alma Alta Declaration called 
upon nations to provide for the availability of essential health care, including 
education concerning the prevention and control of health problems and 
diseases.61  
C. Non-Human-Rights Approaches Similarly Serve to Encourage States 
to Implement AIDS Prevention Measures  
While the health-and-human-rights approach to AIDS prevention has 
gained prominence, many commentators instead emphasize approaches that 
have roots pre-dating the origin of the health-and-human-rights model, and 
that focus on pragmatic concerns such as the detrimental effect of the AIDS 
epidemic on economic and security factors.62 
                                           
56
  CRC, supra note 3, art. 24(1).  
57
  Officer of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 51.  
58
  See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), art. 16, (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986); Organization of 
American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), art. 10, opened for signature Nov. 17, 
1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999); and, European Convention on the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as 
amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 
1971, 1 January 1990, and 1 November 1998 respectively).  
59
   Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 313. 
60
  Id. at 314; see, e.g., 1993 World Conference on Human Rights (U.N. 1993c, 1998a); 1995 World 
Summit for Social Development (U.N. 1995b).  
61
  Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 320.   
62
  See, e.g., Fidler, supra note 18 (examining the linkage between public health issues, including 
HIV/AIDS, and national security); David P. Fidler, Fighting the Axis of Illness: HIV/AIDS, Human Rights, 
and U.S. Foreign Policy, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 99 (2004) (examining HIV/AIDS as a U.S. national 
security issue); J.M. Spectar, The Olde Order Crumbleth: HIV-Pestilence As a Security Issue & New 
Thinking About Core Concepts in International Affairs, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. REV. 481 (2003) 
(examining the link between HIV/AIDS and national, regional, and global security); International Crisis 
Group, HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, ICG Report (Washington, D.C./Brussels June 19, 2001), available at 
http://www.icg.org//library/documents/report_archive/A400321_19062001.pdf; Alex de Waal, Why the 
HIV/AIDS Pandemic is a Structural Threat to Africa’s Governance and Economic Development, 27 FALL 
FLETCHER F. ON WORLD AFF. 6 (2003); Susan K. Sell, Trade Issues and HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 933 (2003).  
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1. The HIV/AIDS epidemic is seen as a threat to national security  
Various nations and commentators conceptualize HIV/AIDS as a 
national and international security threat because the severity of the 
epidemic correlates to national and international unrest.63  According to the 
International Crisis Group,64 “AIDS can no longer be understood or 
responded to as primarily a public health crisis.  It is becoming a threat to 
security.”65  Likewise, in January of 2000, the U.N. Security Council 
addressed the disease in terms of security implications,66 and for the first 
time passed a unanimous resolution relating to HIV/AIDS.67  The resolution 
recognized that an unchecked HIV/AIDS pandemic could pose a risk to 
stability and security, and encouraged interested member states to assist with 
the creation and execution of policies for HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment.68  Beginning with the administration of U.S. President Clinton, 
who “claimed that emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, especially 
HIV/AIDS, constituted a national security threat and foreign policy 
challenge for the United States,”69 U.S. policy has similarly conceptualized 
HIV/AIDS as a security issue.70 
While the health-and-human-rights regime focuses on the ethical 
duties of states to deal with HIV/AIDS, conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a 
security issue encourages states to take action to further their own individual 
and collective interests.  Conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a security issue 
encourages high-prevalence states to deal with the AIDS epidemic within 
their borders in order to preserve national security.71  In the hardest-hit 
countries in Africa, for example, “the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS on 
the military forces, economies, and governance systems . . . represents a 
direct national security threat . . . because HIV/AIDS is destroying the 
material sources of state power.”72  The fact that HIV/AIDS is harmful to the 
power and stability of a regime is a factor likely to encourage a state 
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concerned with its own survival to take measures proven successful to quell 
the spread of the epidemic.   
Conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a security issue also encourages 
wealthier states to channel resources into high-prevalence states in order to 
prevent the global spread of the disease and further international and 
collective security.73  A former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. responded to 
the Security Council resolution regarding HIV/AIDS: “We have to recognize 
that while interdependence gives economic opportunities, it also can pose 
global threats.  You cannot deny AIDS a visa; you cannot embargo it or 
quarantine it; you cannot stop it at a border.  That is why we must work 
together.”74  Conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a security issue encourages 
states to funnel resources into high prevalence countries in order to serve 
their own security interests. 75 
2. The HIV/AIDS epidemic is also seen as a threat to national economy  
Likewise, various nations and commentators attempt to promote the 
implementation of prevention measures by focusing on HIV/AIDS as a 
threat to economic vitality and stability.76  Like the security approach, an 
economics approach to HIV/AIDS prevention encourages states to take 
action not out of an obligation to respect the fundamental right to health, but 
to further their own individual and collective interests.77  Simply put, 
employing AIDS prevention measures benefits a developing nation because 
the economic impact of AIDS is greater than the economic cost of 
implementing such measures.78  AIDS has the cumulative effect of 
decreasing productivity and increasing costs.79  The impact of the disease 
reduced the gross domestic product (“GDP”) of Africa’s hardest-hit 
countries by one percent.80  HIV/AIDS also decreases business investment 
as the consumer-base diminishes and becomes more impoverished.81   
AIDS’ ability to weaken national economies may also have 
international implications because “AIDS-fuelled economic disintegration, if 
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left unchecked, could cut severely into world supplies of key natural 
resources.”82  The international economic effects of AIDS therefore motivate 
developed nations, at least to some extent, to funnel resources into high 
prevalence developing nations in order to protect their own economic 
interests.83  
D. Many Commentators Reject Non-Human Rights Approaches to 
HIV/AIDS Prevention as Overly Concerned With the Interests of 
Developed Countries and Lacking an Ethical Focus 
While such pragmatic approaches to HIV/AIDS prevention are not 
necessarily incompatible with an approach that focuses on AIDS prevention 
as a right-to-health duty, a tension exists between them.  Prominent 
commentator David Fidler suggests, for example, that “the universalist, 
right-to-health ideology that guided international public health in the WHO’s 
first five decades is, controversially, giving way to arguments centered again 
on the self-interests of the great powers.”84  He further questions why many 
public health officials consider human rights law the “crown jewel” of 
global public health strategy in the first place.85   
On the other hand, many health-and-human-rights commentators 
disparage security and economic approaches as lacking the fundamental 
rights focus of the health-and-human-rights model, criticizing the “self-
serving relativism” of the non-human-rights-based approaches.86  Implicit in 
such arguments is the suggestion that the health-and-human-rights approach 
is, or should be, the exclusive or preeminent way to encourage states to 
comply with suggested AIDS prevention measures.  Jonathan Mann, former 
director of WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS, and the founding father of 
the health-and-human-rights approach to HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment, stated that “the human rights framework offers public health a 
more coherent, comprehensive, and practical framework for analysis and 
action on the societal root causes of vulnerability to HIV/AIDS than any 
framework inherited from traditional public health or biomedical science” 
(emphasis added).87  Such statements suggest that health and human rights 
should be the approach taken to HIV/AIDS prevention in place of, rather 
than in addition to, approaches that focus on the detrimental effect of AIDS 
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on economies and security.  As David Fidler states, “[m]any public health 
experts see human rights as . . . the best way to promote and protect public 
health” (emphasis added).88   
III. THE OVERALL RATE OF HIV/AIDS INFECTION IS STEADILY INCREASING 
IN BURMA AS A RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT’S FAILURE TO INSTITUTE 
PREVENTION MEASURES 
Successful strategies to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS are clearly 
established, proven in practice by states such as Thailand with once-serious 
epidemics, and readily available for implementation.89  While the similarity 
of Burma’s and Thailand’s AIDS epidemics suggest that the measures 
employed in Thailand would also be successful in Burma, the Burmese 
government has failed to employ such strategies to combat HIV/AIDS 
within its borders.90  As a result, the rate of HIV/AIDS within Burma 
continues to increase. 
 
A. The International Community and Thailand Have Established 
Successful Prevention Strategies  
 
Strategies that work to dampen the spread of HIV/AIDS, especially 
those aimed at the sex industry, are no longer a mystery.  According to a 
comprehensive 2004 report from the organization Monitoring the AIDS 
Pandemic (“MAP”), commercial sex remains the most common risk 
behavior and driving force of the epidemic in Asia, while needle-sharing 
between injection drug users (“IDUs”) also contributes significantly to the 
epidemic in many Asian countries.91  Thus, it should come as little surprise 
that the recommended approaches for tackling the epidemic in these 
countries include prevention and education campaigns aimed at cutting the 
proportion of men who engage in commercial sex, promoting the use of 
condoms among those who do,92 and promoting safe and consistent access to 
sterile injecting equipment for IDUs.93  These HIV/AIDS prevention and 
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treatment strategies are well-accepted and have proven successful in 
practice.94 
Burma’s neighbor, Thailand, is widely regarded as a model of 
successful HIV/AIDS prevention.95  While Thailand’s prevention strategies 
have not yet had a significant impact on HIV/AIDS in the IDU population,96 
Thailand is nevertheless one of the few countries that has managed to curb 
the spread of a potentially serious AIDS epidemic.97  The country has the 
second highest prevalence rate in Asia behind Cambodia, and was the first 
country in Asia to document HIV among IDUs, female sex workers 
(“FSWs”), and their clients.98  Working with international organizations such 
as WHO and UNAIDS, Thailand responded to the epidemic early, focusing 
specifically on reducing the number of men visiting FSWs and promoting 
condom use in all sexual interactions.99  As a result of these efforts, the 
percentage of adult men engaging in commercial sex annually fell from 
roughly 25% to 10%,100 condoms are now used in 90% of commercial sex 
transactions,101 the rate of HIV among FSWs declined from its peak of 33% 
in 1994 to 12% in 2002,102 and the overall rate of AIDS in Thailand is 
steadily declining.103  It is likely that Thailand’s rate of infection would have 
been in the millions rather than the hundreds of thousands had Thailand not 
vigorously promoted condom use.104 
 
B.  Burma Has Failed to Effectively Institute Any of the Proven 
Prevention Strategies 
 
The similarity of Burma’s and Thailand’s AIDS epidemics suggest 
that Burma could succeed in combating AIDS using some of the same 
measures implemented by Thailand.  Like Thailand, Burma’s AIDS 
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epidemic is largely fuelled by the sex industry, with IDUs also playing a 
prominent role in the transmission of the disease.105  Furthermore, the rates 
and general trends of HIV infections among IDUs and FSWs in Burma are 
similar to those in the early years of Thailand’s epidemic, a factor that 
suggests that Burma could successfully combat its AIDS epidemic using 
Thailand’s approach as a model.106  Likewise, the first two objectives of the 
Joint Programme of Action engaged in by Burma and UNAIDS include 
preventative measures successful in Thailand and elsewhere.107  The first, 
“[i]ndividual risk of sexual transmission of HIV reduced,” recommends 
measures to promote the consistent use of condoms by making them more 
accessible and affordable, particularly in the context of paid sex.108  The 
second, “[i]ndividual risk of HIV transmission among injecting drug users 
and their partners reduced,” recommends measures to improve the access 
and quality of drug treatment measures aimed at lowering the rate of needle-
sharing among IDUs.109 
Burma has yet to effectively institute any of the measures suggested 
by the international community, the UNAIDS plan, or the Thailand model.110 
Burma’s rate of HIV/AIDS reflects this failure.  While Thailand’s “100% 
condoms” program decreased the rate of HIV infection in the FSW 
community from 33% in 1994 to 12% in 2003, HIV prevalence among those 
FSWs tested in Burma increased from 4% in 1992 to 32% in 2003. 111  The 
overall rate of HIV/AIDS is steadily increasing in turn.112 
The Burmese government has not only failed to allocate resources to 
implement the prevention measures outlined in the UNAIDS plan, but also 
maintains policies that actually impair prevention measures.  For example, 
while Burma has publicly announced that condom use is now part of its 
prevention campaigns, women are still routinely arrested for possessing 
condoms on the assumption that those who carry them work in the sex 
trade.113  Furthermore, Burma’s Press Scrutiny Board (“PSB”) still censors 
AIDS coverage and bans the word “condom” from appearing in literature.114  
Indeed, state media are largely banned from reporting about AIDS 
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altogether.115  Similarly, while needles and syringes can be purchased with a 
prescription, they are illegal to carry and may result in a fine and up to six 
months in prison.116   The HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns that have been 
implemented avoid any mention of sex or the need for drug addicts to use 
clean needles, instead urging people to “stay faithful to your spouse” and 
“respect family values.”117  Recent news articles report that Burmese 
authorities threatened a youth member of the rival democratic party with 
arrest for advocating the prevention of HIV/AIDS, ordering him to take 
down a signboard on his house reading, “Let us prevent AIDS from 
spreading,”118 and arrested a seventy-year-old man for possessing and 
reading an educational leaflet on the prevention of HIV/AIDS.119  Thus, 
Burma’s restrictive policies towards condoms, syringes, and education 
regarding their use seriously hampers efforts to quell the spread of the 
epidemic. 
IV. BURMA IS NOT BOUND TO IMPLEMENT HIV/AIDS PREVENTION 
MEASURES BY AN OBLIGATION TO PROTECT THE INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 
Despite the contentions of many health-and-human-rights adherents, a 
health-and-human-rights approach to HIV/AIDS prevention is simply not 
workable in every situation.  While the AIDS situation in Burma is dire, 
Burma has failed to implement even the most minimal of prevention 
measures.120  The health-and-human-rights approach will not work to 
encourage Burma’s compliance with such recommendations because 
international human rights law lacks the binding or enforcement power 
necessary to compel Burma’s cooperation.  The right to health is a vague 
concept, and the duties of states such as Burma under the right to health are 
unclear.  This lack of clarity renders a state’s duties to prevent the spread of 
HIV/AIDS under the right imprecise as well.  In addition, Burma is not a 
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party to any treaty with a right-to-health obligation broad enough to 
encompass HIV/AIDS prevention measures, and the vagueness of the right 
to health precludes its classification as customary international law.121  
Finally, even if there was a binding right-to-health obligation on Burma 
broad enough to encompass HIV/AIDS prevention, international human 
rights law lacks the mechanisms to enforce such an obligation on an 
unwilling state such as Burma. 
A.  The Ambiguity Inherent in the Right to Health Inhibits the Formation 
of a Universal Standard or Clear HIV/AIDS Prevention Duties 
The right to health is an inherently ambiguous concept that has largely 
“defied efforts to give it more than a broad, aspirational meaning.”122  WHO 
first recognized the right to health as a fundamental right in its constitution, 
defining health broadly as a “state of complete physical, mental, and social 
wellbeing.”123  Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic and 
Social Rights (“ICESCR”) defined the right as “the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.”124  The United Nation’s Economic 
and Social Council released a General Comment in 2000 in an attempt to 
further elucidate the right to health.125  The Comment incorporates both 
medical care and preventative measures within the right-to-health mandate:  
 
The committee interprets the right to health, as defined in 
article 12.1 [of the ICESCR], as an inclusive right extending 
not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to the 
underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and 
potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of 
safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and 
environmental conditions, and access to health-related 
education and information, including on sexual and 
reproductive health.126 
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Despite these broad definitions of the right to health, a government does not 
have a duty to ensure the perfect health of its populace.  As one commentator 
states, “[t]he overall human rights framework allows individuals life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of obesity.”127 
Likewise, a state is not obligated to devote as many resources as are 
needed to fully realize the right to health regardless of the state’s available 
economic resources.128  Rather, as the Economic and Social Council 
Comment on the right to health states, “[t]he notion of ‘the highest attainable 
standard of health’ in article 12.1 [of the ICECSR] takes into account both 
the individual’s biological and socio-economic preconditions and a State’s 
available resources.”129  Thus, poorer countries are not required to spend as 
much per capita on health as wealthier countries, and the rate of infectious 
diseases in countries such as Burma need not necessarily be comparable to 
those in countries such as the United States.130 
Instead, a state’s compliance with the right to health depends on the 
universally recognized principle of “progressive realization,”131 whereby a 
state progressively works “as expeditiously and effectively as possible”132 
toward fulfilling right-to-health goals “within the parameters of available 
economic resources and epidemiological conditions.”133  While the principle 
of progressive realization recognizes the economic disparities that may 
effect the ability of states to promote health within their borders, a state is 
nonetheless required to “show constant progress in moving towards full 
realization of rights.”134  Hence, while the inability of a state to comply with 
health obligations may be permissible under progressive realization, a total 
unwillingness of a state party to comply with its right-to-health obligations is 
not.135 
The concept of progressive realization affects the general duties of 
states in terms of the right to health.  Generally speaking, a government’s 
responsibility in regard to the right to health is understood to include 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the right.136  A government must 
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respect the right by not violating it directly (e.g., withholding care from 
prisoners), protect the right by preventing its violation by non-state actors 
(e.g., making it illegal to deny health insurance to a sub-population), and 
fulfill the right by implementing affirmative measures towards its 
achievement.137  When these duties are examined through the lens of 
progressive realization, however, it becomes difficult to determine at what 
point a government crosses the line between permissible inaction due to lack 
of resources, and impermissible inaction in violation of the right to health.138  
Because the principle of progressive realization guarantees that a right-to- 
health treaty provision will mean different things depending on the 
economic situation of the state to which it applies, the principle both “creates 
problems for elaborating the content of the right to health” itself, and 
likewise, makes it more difficult to determine whether a particular state is 
violating its health obligations.139  As one commentator stated, “[t]his sort of 
generalized approach leaves one with little hard content; if the right to health 
covers everything, then it means nothing.”140  In response to this ambiguity, 
commentators have attempted to clarify a government’s right-to-health 
obligations under progressive realization by analyzing relevant treaties for 
both minimum and maximum content,141 as well as positive and negative 
duties in regard to the right to health.142 
The minimum-content approach attempts to construct a narrower 
definition of the right-to-health in addition to the broad, aspirational 
definitions above, by giving more concrete content to right-to-health 
obligations and defining the duties of all states under progressive 
realization.143  For example, WHO’s right-to-health initiative is premised on 
the assumption that there exists a universal minimum right to primary health 
care, regardless of a particular state’s economic resources.144  A health care 
program must include, at a minimum, “education concerning prevailing 
health problems and the methods of preventing and controlling them”145 and 
“prevention and control of locally endemic diseases.”146 
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Establishing negative and positive duties of states under this narrower 
right-to-health obligation is another way commentators have attempted to 
solidify state responsibility.147  As one commentator states:  
 
The narrower, core conception of the right includes negative 
and positive aspects.  Examples of the negative aspect include 
the duty of states to refrain from barring access to health-related 
information and the duty of states not to take health-harming 
actions.  The affirmative aspect of the narrow, core right to 
health imposes a duty on a state to intervene or to act, to the 
extent of its available resources, to prevent, reduce, or address 
serious threats to the health of individuals or the population.  
An example may be a failure of a state to address the AIDS 
epidemic through at least education and minimal public health 
actions.148 
 
Under the negative-positive duty rubric, a state has both a negative duty not 
to prevent access to health information or take actions harmful to health, and 
a positive duty to take at least some affirmative steps to educate the public 
regarding health.149  The focus on a state’s negative duties theoretically 
overcomes the vagueness inherent in progressive realization, at least in 
regard to those things that a state must refrain from doing.  If it costs nothing 
for a state simply not to impede the flow of information, then there is no 
problem of lack of resources upon which the progressive realization 
principle is premised.  Thus, such negative duties can theoretically be made 
binding on parties to right-to-health treaty provisions regardless of their 
economic resources.  For example, it could be argued that a state has a 
negative duty not to censor information regarding how to prevent the spread 
of AIDS.  Because it does not cost a state anything to simply refrain from 
acting, economic disparities between countries would not render the duty to 
refrain from censoring more difficult in a poorer country.  Thus, the duty not 
to censor could theoretically be made binding on those states that are parties 
to treaties with right-to-health provisions regardless of economic disparities 
and regardless of the principle of progressive realization. 
Despite the apparent clarity of the negative conception of a state’s 
right-to-health duties, some ambiguity exists even under this narrower 
characterization.  For example, some nations prefer to forego or limit 
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condom promotion campaigns in favor of campaigns promoting 
abstinence.150  Such abstinence-only programs, like those found in the 
United States,151 are likely the best-funded HIV prevention programs in the 
world.152  Whether such nations are violating the right to health of their 
people by inhibiting the flow of information about condom use is unclear, 
but the fact that many states choose abstinence promotion over the 
endorsement of condom use highlights the absence of a universally accepted 
duty of states to protect the right to health, even in the negative sense.  
As for the affirmative duties under this narrower conception, the 
vagueness inherent in progressive realization still inhibits the formation of a 
universal standard. 153  For example, while there is a basic affirmative duty 
for a state to take steps to prevent locally endemic diseases, “the allocative 
problem exists just as strongly for [this] basic, almost minimal activit[y].”154 
The duty of any particular state is still dependent on the extent of its 
available resources and a violation of the right to health under the 
affirmative prong still depends on a case-by-case analysis.155  Despite the 
difficulties with progressive realization and accompanying minimum-
content analysis of the right to health, these methods are most commonly 
used to analyze and give substance to a state’s obligation under the right to 
health.156 
When the obligation of states to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS is 
conceptualized under the rubric of international human rights law generally 
and the right to health specifically, the scope of the obligation suffers from 
the same ambiguities.  A broadly defined right to health, such as WHO’s 
definition as “a state of complete physical, mental, and social well being,” 
can’t realistically be achieved in any context and is simply unenforceable.157  
Similarly, the principle of progressive realization renders the right to health 
indeterminate, and whether a particular state’s AIDS program violates the 
state’s right-to-health obligations is largely dependent on the state’s 
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particular economic situation, and must be determined by an analysis of that 
situation rather than simply by reference to a universal standard.158 
Defining the right to health more narrowly for the purpose of 
identifying enforceable criteria may help to determine when a state violates 
its right-to-health obligations with regard to AIDS.159  Similarly, 
distinguishing between a state’s duty to take affirmative steps (such as 
spreading condom awareness) and the duty to refrain from certain activity 
(such as censoring AIDS awareness campaigns by non-state actors) can, 
theoretically, establish some universal duties on the part of states, at least to 
refrain from certain conduct.  As discussed above, however, even under the 
narrower conceptions, a state’s duty to take minimal affirmative steps is 
rendered unclear by the principle of progressive realization, while the state’s 
negative duties are also somewhat ambiguous. 
In sum, even if the right to health is binding on states such as Burma, 
it is unclear what HIV/AIDS prevention measures a state must implement or 
allow in order to comply with its duties in guaranteeing the right to health. 
The ambiguity inherent in the right-to-health concept inhibits the articulation 
of clear HIV/AIDS prevention duties on the part of states under the right to 
health. 
B.  Specific Treaty Provisions to Which Burma Is a Party Fail to 
Establish a Binding Right to Health Obligation Broad Enough to 
Encompass HIV/AIDS Prevention Measures 
There is no right-to-health obligation binding on Burma that clearly 
establishes an obligation to implement HIV/AIDS prevention measures.  
Burma is not a party to the ICESCR, the main international document that 
binds states parties to recognize the right to health.160  The only major 
international human rights treaties to which Burma is a party are CEDAW161 
and CRC.162 
While Burma is bound by the provisions of CEDAW, it is unlikely 
that the health care provision will be interpreted to impose an affirmative 
duty to implement the provisions of the UNAIDS plan.  CEDAW calls on 
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states’ parties “[to] take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those 
related to family planning.”163  The language of the CEDAW health care 
provision is framed in terms of equality in the provision of health care 
services already offered, however, rather than as a duty to provide a 
particular type of health care service (aside from family planning) in the first 
place.164  Additionally, the emphasis of the treaty’s language is on health care 
rather than health itself, which would imply that Burma could satisfy its duty 
simply by providing health care services for those who seek them.  A duty to 
prevent the spread of disease by distributing condoms, raising awareness 
about how to prevent the transmission of the AIDS virus, or otherwise, does 
not clearly fall within this narrow right to health care. 
Similarly, it is unlikely that the CRC’s right-to-health provision will 
impose an affirmative duty on Burma to implement the provisions of the 
UNAIDS plan.  The CRC declares that “States Parties recognize the right of 
the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to 
facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health.”165  In 
addition, the CRC calls on state parties, among other things, to ensure the 
provision of necessary health care to children166 and the development of 
preventative health care.167  While the provision refers to both the broad 
right to health (rather than the more narrow right-to-health-care provision of 
CEDAW) and to the need for preventative health care, the CRC applies only 
to the rights of children, a population of individuals who are much less likely 
to contract the disease through sexual or intravenous drug use activity.168  
Thus, the CRC does not encompass a state duty to supply AIDS prevention 
measures to the adult population. 
C.  The Right to Health Does Not Rise to the Level of Customary 
International Law  
Even if Burma is not a party to a treaty with a general right-to-health 
provision like that contained in ICESCR, such a general right would still be 
binding on Burma if it was found to be customary international law.  
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Customary international law is defined by the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations as that which “results from a general and consistent 
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”169  
Thus, in order to qualify as customary international law, a practice must 
satisfy both the state practice and opinio juris (state’s sense of legal 
obligation) prongs of the customary international law definition.170  Once a 
practice qualifies as customary international law, it is binding on all states 
that have not objected persistently to the practice, regardless of whether they 
have specifically ratified a treaty containing an agreement to comply with 
it.171 
Commentators differ on whether the right to health, or international 
documents containing the right, have ascended to the level of customary 
international law.  Some observers have stated, for example, that “to the 
extent the right to health is enunciated in the UDHR, it is likely customary 
international law,”172 and “there is considerable support for the proposition 
that the rights embodied in the ICESCR should be considered part of 
customary law.”173  Factors that support a finding that the right to health 
constitutes customary international law include the fact that the right is 
found, in one form or another, in numerous multilateral treaties and non-
binding international documents,174 and the fact that many nations have 
established an explicit right to health in their constitutions, otherwise 
subscribed in some way to the right itself, or acceded to international 
documents that contain the right within their provisions.175  Indeed, Burma 
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itself has integrated many of the provisions of the UDHR into its domestic 
law and its constitution.176  In 1999, Burmese Foreign Minister U Win Aung 
categorically stated in an address to the United Nations General Assembly 
that “we fully prescribe [sic] to the human rights norms enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”177  While this pronouncement 
alone does not make the UDHR binding on Burma, such statements may 
serve as indications that its provisions have risen to the level of customary 
international law.178 
On the other hand, many U.S. scholars have rejected the contention 
that economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the right to health, are 
customary international law.179  One article noted that “although some parts 
of the [UDHR] have been so widely recognized that they have become 
customary international law, and therefore binding on all nations that have 
not opposed them, there is no indication that the right to health has been 
recognized in this manner.”180  Likewise, other commentators stated, 
“[w]hile the standard advanced by General Comment 14 [to the ICESCR] 
may eventually become customary international law, the universal 
acceptance of a broad right to health may nonetheless not occur for an 
extended period of time.”181 
The major factor weighing against finding a right to health in 
customary international law is the ambiguity of the right-to-health concept, 
which prevents a consistent state practice, followed out of a sense of legal 
obligation, from developing.  Because the right to health is generally framed 
in broad, aspirational terms, it is very difficult to define the scope of a state’s 
obligations.182  Furthermore, the principle of progressive realization 
guarantees that the right to health differs depending on the context in which 
it applies, making it difficult or impossible to form a customary international 
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law standard.183  Even a core minimum-content approach184 to the right to 
health requires states only to take steps, outside of the core minimum content 
of the right, toward the progressive realization of rights depending on the 
states’ particular economic circumstances.185  If the right to health means 
different things in different contexts, it will be very difficult to show both a 
consistent state practice and an opinio juris of states regarding the right.  
It could be argued that the negative duties of states to refrain from 
taking measures harmful to health or interfering with health information 
have gained the requisite consistent state practice and opinio juris to achieve 
the level of customary international law.186  Under this theory, while Burma 
may not have an affirmative obligation to implement AIDS awareness 
campaigns, distribute condoms, or educate sex workers regarding their use, 
it would have a negative duty under customary international law not to 
interfere with helpful health measures such as the possession of condoms or 
syringes and AIDS awareness campaigns regarding prevention methods. 
It is unclear, in light of the continued popularity of abstinence-only 
campaigns in countries such as the United States and others,187 whether the 
negative duties of states under the right to health obligate them to allow 
information regarding the best methods of preventing HIV/AIDS 
transmission (such as condom use).  Burma may well argue that negative 
duties allow for education regarding certain kinds of prevention measures 
over others.  For instance, while there are reports that Burmese police 
officers arrest those who possess condoms, the Burmese government allows  
abstinence campaigns urging individuals to forego extra-marital sexual 
activity altogether.188  Likewise, while Burma bans the possession of 
syringes, it allows the existence of anti-drug campaigns.189  Many states 
adhere to an abstinence-based platform in their fight against HIV/AIDS, 
thereby choosing a method other than that recommended by the international 
community.  This fact weighs heavily against finding that the 
implementation of those health programs and measures deemed most 
effective by the international community has achieved the consistent state 
practice and opinio juris necessary for customary international law status.  
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D.  Even If Burma Were Bound to Implement HIV/AIDS Prevention 
Measures, International Human Rights Law Lacks Adequate 
Mechanisms to Enforce Such an Obligation 
Finally, even if a duty under the right to health were binding on 
Burma, and the current AIDS policies, or lack thereof, constituted a violation 
of that duty, there are no adequate mechanisms under international human 
rights law to enforce such an obligation.  The lack of enforcement 
mechanisms for human rights law is a general problem of international 
law.190  State sovereignty is one of the guiding principles of international 
law, generally requiring the consent of sovereign entities for them to be 
bound by and comply with international law.191  Thus, the international 
community is reluctant to interfere with a state’s internal affairs, even when 
there is a clear international duty binding on the state and a clear violation of 
that duty by the state.192  Additionally, enforcement of international law is 
fundamentally hindered by the general principle of non-intervention 
enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.193  That section prohibits 
member states from “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state,”194 and thus outlaws all uses of force 
against states, even those states violating clear and binding international 
duties, except when authorized by the U.N. Security Council or when taken 
in self defense.195 
As discussed previously, the duties of a state in regard to health are 
unclear and “getting a handle on the content of the right to health is a 
necessary first step to effective implementation.”196  Until core or negative 
health duties of states are defined so that they apply universally to all states, 
regardless of progressive realization, it is unlikely that the right will have 
clear enough parameters to compel the international community to enforce 
it, even against states with policies as harmful as Burma’s.  Similarly, it is 
not clear that Burma is bound to a right to health general enough to 
encompass the duty to prevent the spread of AIDS at all.  Until Burma either 
accedes to the ICESCR, or the right to health gains customary international 
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law status, it is unlikely that the international community will enforce a 
state’s duty to protect the right in the absence of a clearly binding obligation. 
Even if the international community were willing to enforce a duty on 
Burma to protect the right to health in the context of furthering the AIDS 
prevention cause, mechanisms to do so do not exist.  Social human rights are 
hindered by weak enforcement mechanisms in general.197  Even under the 
ICESCR, there is “no international supervisory body that is entitled to 
receive and examine complaints submitted by individuals who claim to be . . 
. victim[s] of a violation of the right to the highest attainable level of 
health.”198  Thus, the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention, 
the lack of enforcement mechanisms, and the lack of clarity inherent in the 
right to health all render Burma’s duty to implement HIV/AIDS prevention 
measures unenforceable.  
V. BURMA IS UNLIKELY TO BE SWAYED BY THE ETHICAL CALL OF A 
HEALTH-AND-HUMAN-RIGHTS APPROACH 
Due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms in human rights law,199 
compliance with human rights norms in general and the right to health in 
particular depend in large part on state consent.200  Implementation of 
international human rights law domestically depends on national legislation, 
policies, and programs that incorporate and execute human rights norms.201  
The implementation of such national legislation, policies, and programs in 
turn depends on the political willingness of the implementing state.202   Such 
is also the case in regard to the implementation of AIDS prevention 
measures.203  In the words of Kofi Anan, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, “[a]bove all, the challenge of AIDS is a test of leadership.”204  
Therefore, the domestic implementation of international human rights law 
depends in large part on a state’s willingness to recognize and realize its 
ethical duty to respect fundamental human rights.  
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The Burmese government, however, has proven itself highly resistant 
to being swayed by the ethical call of the human rights community.  The 
Burmese government is largely unresponsive to the needs of its populace. 
The current military junta came to power through a military coup in 1962, 
after which it promptly assigned the new government leader, General Ne 
Win, full legislative, judicial, and executive powers of the state.205  In its 
forty years of military rule, Burma’s current regime has “abandoned all 
constitutional structures, has continually silenced any opposition and, above 
all, has continued to apply ruthless and inhumane means to achieve its 
ends—supposedly in the interests of the maintenance of the ‘Union.’”206   
As might be expected, the Burmese military junta has an abysmal 
human rights record.  The long list of abuses perpetrated by the government 
includes: extra-judicial killings by security forces; torture of prisoners and 
detainees; arbitrary arrests; forced labor, including the widespread use of 
forced child labor; forced conscription of civilians into militia units; severe 
restrictions on the freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and 
movement; and, discrimination against and harassment of Muslims and 
women.207 
Likewise, education and health care are low priorities for the 
government, regardless of the needs or desires of the populace.208  Total 
government spending on health has declined by more than seventy percent 
since 1990,209 and the government’s total expenditures on health and 
education are less than one percent of the national GDP.210  The regime 
spends over two hundred percent more on the military than it does on health 
and education combined.211  By comparison, the United States government 
spends almost fourteen percent of its GDP on healthcare, and Canada just 
over nine percent.212 
 Burma’s lack of accountability to its populace and its continued 
unwillingness to comply with international human rights norms indicates 
that Burma’s government is simply unresponsive to the ethical call of 
international human rights law.  In order for international human rights law 
and the right to health to have an effect on Burma’s policies, there must be 
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mechanisms to compel Burma’s compliance.  An appeal to ethics is simply 
not enough. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Burma serves as an example of where the health and human rights 
approach to HIV/AIDS has failed, thereby compelling the conclusion that 
the right to health is not a model that is universally applicable or useful.  
This is not to suggest that other, more pragmatic approaches to the problem 
will necessarily be successful in the Burmese context.  The impact of AIDS 
on Burma’s already weak and isolated economy will not necessarily be 
enough to spur Burma’s regime to take action.  Likewise, while national 
security is a matter of concern for the Burmese government, the impact of 
AIDS is not likely to be a primary concern in light of much more pressing 
security issues. 
Acknowledging the weaknesses of the health-and-human-rights 
approach to HIV/AIDS prevention in the Burmese and other contexts, 
however, can allow for a more holistic and realistic approach to AIDS 
prevention in the developing world.  The approaches taken must incorporate 
both pragmatic and human rights components, depending on the context in 
which they are implemented.  In difficult contexts such as that in Burma, an 
approach that subsumes health and human rights as the best method of 
encouraging compliance with AIDS prevention measures is destined to fail. 
